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Abstract 
Until now, time has been mainly used as a variable in IT-related event studies to explain the delayed 
impact of IT investments on firm value and productivity. Yet, the timing of the event announcement 
itself, due to investor sentiment, may have an effect on its valuation by the capital market. Using the 
example of product source code releases as open source, I find that market valuation takes a 
curvilinear shape over time due to investor sentiment caused by the rise and fall of the dot.com 
bubble. Future IT-related event studies will need to take this potentially interfering effect into account. 
 
Keywords: event study; investor sentiment; dot.com bubble; open source software; 
 
Page 1 of 11 16th European Conference on Information Systems
1 INTRODUCTION 
One factor influencing the valuation of IT investments that seems to have been neglected in event 
studies on the impact of IT investments on the value of firms—and one that is particularly relevant to 
this area—is the assumption of rational investor underlying event studies, that is, that investors treat 
similar investments equally. However, with the dot.com bubble and its burst at the beginning of this 
decade, the IT industry is probably the most prominent example of irrational investor behavior of our 
time. In IT-related event studies, time, so far, has mainly been included to explain the delayed effect of 
IT investments (see, e.g., Im, Dow, & Grover, 2001). Yet, to the knowledge of the author, very few 
event studies have explicitly addressed the effect on market valuation that is inherent in the timing of 
the announcement, that is, the day on which it happened, in relation to investor sentiment in general, 
and, with respect to the IT industry, in particular to the dot.com bubble. In this paper, I thus tackle the 
question whether the timing of a strategic IT investment has an impact on its valuation by the capital 
market. Using the example of firms announcing the release of proprietary product source code as OSS, 
during the time span from January 1, 1999, to April 30, 2007, I find a curvilinear (u-shaped) trend in 
the market reaction to firms announcing the release of source code as OSS which can be ascribed to 
negative investor sentiment after the burst of the dot.com bubble, rendering time a variable that must 
not be ignored it IT-related event studies when the sample, or parts of it, might have been impacted by 
investor sentiment.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I will first review the literature on event studies in 
general and IT-related ones in particular. Next, I introduce the concept of investor sentiment and 
deduce my hypothesis. Afterwards, I explain data and methods used, and, thereafter, present the 
results. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings and limitations of the study and give 
recommendations for future research. 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1 Literature Review 
Event studies have been widely used in the IT and IS literature (see, e.g., Dehning & Richardson, 
2002; Dehning, Richardson, & Zmud, 2003; Dos Santos, Peffers, & Mauer, 1993; Im et al., 2001; Oh, 
Gallivan, & Kim, 2006). In an event study, the stock market reactions on the public announcement of 
specific information affecting a firm are investigated. According to the efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969), the semi-strong form of which is underlying an event study, the 
market reacts to the announcement of new information. Basically all publicly available information 
goes into the stock price of firms. An event is anything that results in new relevant information which 
may have an impact on the future cash flows of a firm (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Thus, when 
firms announce IT-investments to the public the information can be expected to be included in the 
stock price shortly after the announcement (Dann, Mayers, Rafts, & Jr, 1977; Mitchell & Netter, 
1989). 
Past studies have shown that different kinds of IT investments are valuated differently, for example 
that innovative IT investments are valuated more positively than non-innovative ones (Dos Santos et 
al., 1993) and that the strategic importance of IT is related positively to the valuation of 
transformational IT investments (Dehning et al., 2003). They have also shown that firm size or time 
horizon of the investment matter: Im, Dow, and Grover (2001) find a negative reaction of stock price 
and trading volume with respect to firm size, which, however, becomes more positive as time passes. 
The latter is in accordance with findings from related studies that the positive effects of IT investments 
only become visible over time (Brynjolfsson, 1993). 
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2.2 Investor Sentiment 
Time does not only play a role with respect to the effects, that is, the time horizon, of the decision to 
go OSS, the timing of the announcement, too, might be of vital importance. The importance of this 
observation lies in the fact that, sometimes, capital markets may be inefficient with respect to investors 
not behaving rationally. Instead, they, too, are subject to sentiment (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & 
Waldmann, 1990; Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler, 1991): investors will value stocks more positively in a time 
of positive investor sentiment and more negatively in a time of negative investor sentiment. Following 
the definition of Baker and Wurgler (2007), investor sentiment “is a belief about future cash flows and 
investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.” Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997) have shown that it is both costly and risky for investors to buy and sell against 
investor sentiment, leading to an inefficient market that may well result in a crash. Furthermore, 
managers seem to be able to react to investor sentiment, so that they for example time IPOs to happen 
during phases of positive investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2000; Lee et al., 1991), which, with 
arbitrage unlikely to happen as argued before, will even further increase the risk of a crash. The rise 
and fall of Internet-related stocks in the dot.com boom and the eventual burst of the bubble is a prime 
example of this phenomenon. In the following, I will give the results of several studies that help 
illustrate the effect of the dot.com bubble and the market valuation of IT investments. 
As an example for investor sentiment with respect to the IT market around the dot.com bubble burst, 
Lee (2001) and Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) show that IT markets react favorably to firms 
changing their name to include ‘.com’ before mid-2000, whereas Cooper et al. (2005) show a positive 
effect of the removal of ‘.com’ from the firm name after mid-2000. Similarly, Dehning et al. (2004) 
report positive effects on stock price caused by the announcement of e-commerce initiatives in 1998 
and—depending on the method they use—negative effects or indications for those for the forth quarter 
of 2001. 
2.3 Hypothesis 
I will analyze to potential effect of investor sentiment due to the burst of the dot.com bubble using the 
example of firms announcing the release of product source code as open source software (OSS). OSS 
is strongly related with the dot.com bubble as (1) the term “open source” was first publicly announced 
on April 8, 1998, right during the dot.com hype and in the course of the source code release of the 
Internet browser Netscape Navigator (Tiemann, 2006), (2) the spread of OSS and OSS development 
methodologies solely depended on the availability of cheap mass communication as provided by the 
Internet, and (3) the release of product source code is an IT-enabled strategic decision as it has a long-
term impact on the firm, its ability to generate and appropriate value, and the software development 
process. Following the above argumentation on investor sentiment, companies announcing a release of 
product source code under OSS should first have received a premium on their stock price during the 
rise of the dot.com bubble. Other companies should be able to observe this effect and follow suit. With 
the burst of the dot.com bubble in the second half of 2000, market valuation should turn negative. The 
number of release announcements will become smaller, too. 
With a normalization of investor sentiment with respect to IT investments in general and to the 
announcement of the release of (potential) commercial products under an OSS license in particular 
over time, I expect this trend to stabilize, and, eventually, to turn positive, that is, both the number of 
such announcement and their valuation by investors. In the following, I will give several reasons why 
this may be the case, that is, which factors might lead to a normalization of investor sentiment with 
respect to product source code releases following the burst of the dot.com bubble.´While customers 
did not expect to get access to source code to products at all at the beginning of this decade, for some 
segments of the IT industry, this has developed so far as that openness has even become a competitive 
factor, thereby making offering one’s source code as OSS the rule rather than the exception in these 
areas (Henkel, 2006). Moreover, at the time of the burst of the dot.com-bubble, the market only had a 
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rather small number of objects of comparisons showing the positive effects of OSS—especially with 
respects to their long-term sustainability of such a strategy. In the time of skepticism thereafter, 
consequently, investors most likely evaluated the potential of the idea of releasing valuable intellectual 
property into the open skeptically. When positive effects of IT investments and in particular of going 
OSS were becoming visible over time (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Dehning et al., 2003), however, the market 
began to understand the rational behind and the positive effects of the initial decision, and 
consequently reacted more positively to similar future decisions. Again, it is important to note that 
“market reaction” not only includes the behavior of investors observing the market, but also other 
firms observing the success of their competitors’ OSS efforts, that is, the number of firms announcing 
a release of product source code under an OSS license (Baker et al., 2000; Cooper et al., 2005; Lee et 
al., 1991). 
 
H1: Over time, there will be a curvilinear (u-shaped) development of the effect on stock price of firms 
announcing the release of proprietary software as OSS. 
3 DATA AND METHOD 
3.1 Event Study Method and Dependent Variable 
The research design used in this study is mainly based on the papers of McWilliams and Siegel (1997), 
MacKinlay (1997), McWilliams and McWilliams (2000) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). In 
an event study, the stock market reactions on the public announcement of specific information 
affecting a firm are investigated. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the semi-strong form of 
which is underlying an event study, the market reacts to the announcement of new information. 
Basically all publicly available information goes into the stock price of firms. An event is anything 
that results in new relevant information which may have an impact on the future cash flows of a firm 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Thus, when software or technology companies announce the release of 
source code to the public the information of releasing code can be expected to be included in the stock 
price shortly after the announcement. 
In this paper, I define an event as follows: an event is the announcement of the release of proprietary 
source code—that could have been sold (or has been)—under an OSI compliant license either to an 
existing public open source project or by setting up a new public OSS project. Using Lexis Nexis, I 
searched the PR-Newswire, Business Wire, and Market Wire database using the search term “open 
source AND (contribute OR release OR reveal) AND code” from January 1999 to April 2007. After 
checking whether the company that released code was listed on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and 
whether the event fit to the event definition, 111 events by 58 firms were identified. As expected, 
descriptive statistics of the events show a curvilinear trend in the number of events over time. After 
creating a sample of events the time windows had to be specified.  
The length of the windows was strongly orientated on the window length found in the related literature 
(Brown & Warner, 1985; Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams et al., 1997). The 
estimation window was defined as 125 trading days and the event window as two days including the 
event day and the day prior to the event. The inclusion of the day prior to the event was to take 
anticipation effects into account. I then checked for confounding events within this period of time. A 
confounding event was defined as an announcement within the event window that might overshadow 
the effect of the actual event on the stock price of the company. Confounding events were for example 
the announcement of new products, information about pending lawsuits, or the release of quarterly or 
annual reports.  
The check for confounding events eliminated 69 of the 111 events. A possible reason for the mass of 
confounding events may be that many software companies tend to publish information on new 
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products, strategic partnerships, etc. in bundles on conferences and other mass events.1 In addition, 
four more events had to be removed from the sample; three events because the IPO of the respective 
firms had only happened recently, so that the available stock price data would not have sufficed for the 
125-day estimation window. Another event was removed because the respective firm was considered 
for delisting at the time of the event. A list of all remaining 38 events by 30 firms with no confounding 
events is given in Table 1. 
 
ID Firm Date CARi Main OSS business model as stated 
1 3DFX INTERACTIVE 1999-03-01 0.86% Complementary goods or services 
2 APPLIX 1999-03-02 10.86% Complementary goods or services 
3 SILICON GRAPHICS  1999-04-26 4.18% Complementary goods or services 
4 VISIO  1999-07-27 5.32% Dual licensing 
5 SILICON GRAPHICS 2000-02-14 -0.57% Complementary goods or services 
6 BINDVIEW DEV 2000-02-15 -0.84% Business transformation 
7 SUN MICROSYSTEMS 2000-03-13 -3.92% Complementary goods or services 
8 INTEL 2000-06-15 -3.27% Complementary goods or services 
9 SYBASE 2000-08-22 -1.80% Cost or risk reduction 
10 CADENCE DESIGN SYS. 2000-09-11 12.39% Complementary goods or services 
11 SAP 2000-10-04 -3.79% Complementary goods or services 
12 SANCHEZ COMPUTER ASSOCS. 2000-11-06 4.97% Complementary goods or services 
13 PROGRESS SOFTWARE 2000-12-11 0.02% Complementary goods or services 
14 ADAPTEC 2001-01-30 1.05% Complementary goods or services 
15 SUN MICROSYSTEMS 2001-04-25 -8.38% Business transformation 
16 ON2 TECHS. 2001-08-07 1.08% Business transformation 
17 IBM 2001-11-05 -1.36% Business transformation 
18 OPENWAVE SYS. 2002-05-30 -3.01% Complementary goods or services 
19 ORACLE 2002-08-14 1.12% Complementary goods or services 
20 APPLE 2002-09-25 -2.25% Business transformation 
21 COMMERCE ONE 2003-04-29 -7.57% Business transformation 
22 REALNETWORKS 2003-07-07 -0.48% Dual licensing 
23 BEA SYSTEMS 2004-05-19 1.26% Complementary goods or services 
24 TIPPINGPOINT TECHS. 2004-11-01 11.50% Complementary goods or services 
25 IONA TECHNOLOGIES 2005-06-20 -1.09% Business transformation 
26 EBAY 2005-06-21 -2.51% Complementary goods or services 
27 QUOVADX  2005-07-19 -2.97% Business transformation 
28 ORACLE 2005-08-09 0.88% Complementary goods or services 
29 IBM 2005-08-09 0.61% Complementary goods or services 
30 IBM 2005-08-15 0.42% Business transformation 
31 AUTODESK 2006-03-07 -1.04% Complementary goods or services 
32 WIND RIVER SYSTEMS 2006-07-31 1.46% Complementary goods or services 
33 SUN MICROSYSTEMS 2006-08-23 3.21% Business transformation 
34 TIBCO SOFTWARE 2006-10-02 0.67% Dual licensing 
35 QUALCOMM 2006-10-11 4.92% Cost or risk reduction 
36 ADOBE SYSTEMS 2006-11-07 2.75% Business transformation 
37 SUN MICROSYSTEMS 2006-11-13 -2.09% Business transformation 
38 ADOBE SYSTEMS 2007-04-26 0.07% Dual licensing 
Table 1. List of all events 
As is shown in Figure 1, as expected, we find a curvilinear trend in the number of event announcement 
over time in the sample when both including and excluding confounding events. 
 
1 An example of such a conference is the JavaOne conference organized by Sun Microsystems Inc. (SUN, 2007).  
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Figure 1. Distribution of events over time 
Using the market model and the NASDAQ Composite Index as comparable market index, I then 
calculated the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) for each event, which was the dependent variable in 
the multivariate analysis. 
3.2 Independent and Control Variables 
In order to measure the effect of time, I calculated the number of days that had passed since the press 
conference on April 8, 1998 (Tiemann, 2006) in which “open source” was coined and the day of the 
event. For ease of interpretation, I divided this figure by 365.25 to arrive at the number of years. To 
account for the assumed curvilinear relationship, I included a variable “time-squared.” 2 
With respect to control variables, Henkel (2006) found that small firms tend to release more code 
since they lack development resources and benefit from external development support. In addition, I 
included the firm’s R&D-to-sales and sales-per-employee ratio to account for research intensity of the 
firm and employee productivity. Sales per employee were transformed to sales per 1000 employees to 
ease interpretability of the results. To account for the type of IT investment inherent in the decision to 
go OSS, the business model the company chose to do so was included. In the press releases, I looked 
for information which business models the firm was primarily intending to follow. I distinguished 
between (solely) long-term strategic investments that targeted at transforming the industry the 
company was active in on the one hand and on business models with a short to mid-term impact on 
bottom-line profits of the corporation as inherent in the business models cost or risk reduction, dual 
licensing, and sale of complementary goods and assets. This was coded as a dummy variable with 
respect to whether the business transformation model was employed or not. In order to ensure 
 
2 Similarly, one may include dummy variables for the separate years (see, e.g., Aggarwal, Dai, & Walden, 2006) which 
would also allow to more accurately analyze for different effects in the individual years. I refrained from doing so in this 
study and instead used the time and time-squared measures to reduce the number of variables in the regression because of 
the sample size. I have also conducted a regression using only time-dummy variables, dropping the singular event from 
2007, arriving at similar results as those depicted herein. 
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reliability of this variable, multiple coders completed such a categorization independently of one 
another. Differences were resolved in discussions afterwards, and the final categorization was 
unanimously accepted. Descriptive statistics are available in Table 2, correlations are given in Table 3. 
 
Median Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
CARi 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.12 
Time 4.41 4.86 2.74 0.90 9.05 
Time2 19.43 30.96 27.78 0.80 81.88 
ln(Total Assets) 14.40 14.37 2.58 8.28 18.46 
ln(Total Assets)2 207.26 212.91 72.38 68.49 340.74 
R&D-to-sales 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.06 1.74 
Sales per 1000 employees 0.28 2.30 12.48 0.00 77.21 
Business transformation 0.00 0.32  0 1 
Cost/Risk reduction 0.00 0.05  0 1 
Dual licensing 0.00 0.11  0 1 
Compl. goods or services 1.00 0.53  0 1 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics (N=38) 
 
CARi Time Time2 ln(Total 
assets) 
R&D- 
to-sales 
Sales per 1000 
employees 
Business 
transformation 
CARi 1
Time -0.05 1      
Time2 0.01 0.98** 1     
ln 
(Total assets) -0.12 0.20 0.18 1    
R&D-to-sales -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.56** 1   
Sales per 1000
employees 0.41* 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.02 1  
Business 
transformation -0.34* 0.22 0.18 -0.04 0.28† -0.11 1 
Table 3. Correlation table (N=38; † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; p-values are two-sided) 
4 RESULTS 
Independent Variable Coefficient value 
Time -0.030* 
Time2 0.003* 
ln(Total assets) -0.040 
ln(Total assets)2 0.001 
R&D-to-sales -0.029 
Sales per 1000 employees 0.002** 
Business model: business transformation (dummy) -0.025† 
Constant 0.379† 
Table 4. Results of OLS regression on CAR using business model “business transformation” as 
reference group (†p < .10*, p < .05, **; p < .01; p-values are two-sided) 
As expected, descriptive statistics show a curvilinear trend in the number of announcements over time 
(see Figure 1). Turning to the abnormal returns, I take a look at factors influencing the CAR for 
individual events. Conducting a regression analysis with CARi as dependent variable using the 
independent and control variables introduced before, I arrive at a model with an R2 of 44% (see Table 
4). With respect to my hypothesis, I find that both measures for time—years since the inception and 
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OSS and years squared—carry the expected sign and are highly significant (pone-sided < 0.01 for both) 
resulting in the predicted curvilinear trend.  
To control for possible autocorrelation effects between, that is, events originating from the same firm, 
in the regression, I reduced the sample to include only one event by one firm (N = 30) by using only 
the first or only the last event by the respective firms in two separate regression. In both analyses, the 
effect of time remains significant (all p-values = 0.02). Similar tests where conducted for events 
having happened shortly after one another only to find identical results. 
5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
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Figure 2.  Projected CARs using only time and time squared 
In this study, I have shown that the timing of a strategic IT investment drives its valuation by the 
capital market. I find that there is a curvilinear trend that is most likely explained by investor 
sentiment. Initially, that is, during the dot.com hype, I see a positive valuation of OSS by the capital 
market that, however, turns negative with the burst of the bubble. In fact, if I use the regression 
coefficients from Table 4 and insert mean values for all other variables but time (see Figure 2), the 
date value of the first root of the resulting quadratic equation turns out to be January 10, 2001, which 
is right after the dot.com crash. The second root is August 13, 2005, coming shortly before the 
NASDAQ price increased to and then stabilized around 2,300 points—the highest value since 2001—
and during a series of source code releases in 2005. Furthermore, when I assign the events to two 
groups based on whether they lie within or outside this time interval, I see that they significantly differ 
in their market valuation (see Table 5). Moreover, I see a nearly identically shaped trend for the 
number of announcements per years, which indicates deliberate management action in response to 
investor sentiment. 
 
Date of Announcement  Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
10/1/01 – 08/13/05 16 -0.008 0.011 0.044 
Other 22 0.016 0.009 0.043 
T-test 0.054† (p-value, one-sided)   
Table 5.  Effect of investor sentiment (univariate analysis) 
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Of course, I do not expect this evaluation to become infinitively more positive but rather to level off at 
zero—at which point in time the release of source code under an OSS license will have truly become 
mainstream firm behavior. In addition, I think that the curvilinear relationship observed in this study 
may well hold for more segments of the IT sector and related industries. Henkel and Käs (2007) have 
for example observed that the number of firms releasing source code in several areas of embedded 
computing such as single-board computers has been steadily increasing over the last years. I would 
assume market reaction to the respective announcements to follow a similar u-shape.  
What is more, I think that this study has generally illustrated the effect that investor sentiment towards 
a certain action has on its valuation on the market and how investor sentiment and management 
reaction to it can change over time. First, during the time of the dot.com bubble, OSS—as probably 
any other Internet-related IT investment—was heartily embraced by the capital market and firms 
announcing an OSS strategy saw their stock price increase abnormally. Managers observing and 
understanding this would consequently think about if and how their firms could also release product 
source code as OSS. With the bubble burst and investor sentiment turning negative, both the valuation 
and the number of OSS strategies decreased. When the stock market, especially the NASDAQ, 
stabilized and began to again steadily increase in value, firms making OSS-related announcements 
could again achieve positive abnormal returns and, again, the number of firms doing so consequently 
increased. I would thus expect studies analyzing the development of stock prices or IPO performance 
in the IT sector and maybe also related industries such as telecommunications to find an underlying 
curvilinear trend over time with respect to market performance caused by investor sentiment on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, with respect to the number of announcements caused by managers’ 
deliberate reaction to the perceived investor sentiment. Maybe such a curvilinear trend can also be 
found in the datasets that have been analyzed in previous event studies on the effect of IT investments 
on the market value of the firm.3
Like any other event study this paper faces some limitations. One limitation may be the rather small 
sample size. Limiting the event window to one day so that the confounding check eliminates fewer 
events might seem as a solution to this problem, however, as I expect rather strong anticipation effects 
on the day preceding the event, this does not seem to be a wise choice. Rather, one might think about 
expanding the search terms and applying those to more and different data sources as the ones used in 
the study, or recomposing the study in a couple of years: since the number of qualified events has been 
steadily increasing over the past view years, redoing the study in a few years time should produce a 
much larger sample size. In such a study, learning effects of firms over time might be analyzed, too, 
that is, such studies could look at whether the success or failure in previous efforts to release source 
code under an OSS license has an impact on the market valuation of another such announcement.  
This study has shown the effect of investor sentiment on the market valuation of Internet-related IT 
investments using the example of product source code releases as open source. I have shown that, over 
time, the market values similar investments differently just because of the timing of the 
announcement. Similarly, managers were able to react to this and increased or reduced the number of 
corresponding actions depending on investor sentiment. The timing of the announcement, 
consequently, is an important variable influencing market valuation, and must not be ignored in IT-
related event studies in which the sample, or parts of it, may come from periods of time during which 
strong investor sentiments are to be expected. 
 
3 This curvilinear trend still holds when integration an interaction term between time and the business transformation 
model to capture potential long-term effects of this business model. Moreover, the new coefficient is positive and 
significant (pone-sided = 0.05), indicating that the market, over time, has come to better appreciate this business model, too. 
Another possible explanation might be that firms have come to understand that the business transformation model alone 
is not sustainable—or at least not accordingly valuated by the capital market—and over time learned to combine it 
effectively with one of the other models. 
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